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ACCOUNT BOOKS AS
EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS
PAUL F. KINNAR 1
A DMISSIBILITY of account books in evidence is
questioned, it is safe to say, every day. It is almost
equally as safe to say that there is more confused
thinking, more fallacious reasoning, and more down-
right erroneous rulings upon this point than upon any
other rule of evidence which is considered as frequently
as this one is. Despite the clarity of the statute, and
despite the large number of cases decided under it, the
rules relating to such evidence are involved, technical,
and, unfortunately, still highly controversial.
The purpose of this article is to discuss generally the
Illinois rules regarding the admissibility into evidence
of account books for the purpose of proving or disprov-
ing a claim founded upon goods sold or services ren-
dered, and to discuss more particularly section 3 of the
Illinois Evidence Act of 1867,2 its effect upon the com-
mon law rules applied before its enactment, and the
law in Illinois as it now exists under both the statute
and the common law.
A casual inspection of the problem is worse than none
at all. To reconcile decisions which hold opposite ways
on sets of facts that are almost identical, it is necessary
to proceed with the utmost caution carefully to analyze
the facts, the ruling, and the exact ground upon which
1 Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 Cahill's Illinois Revised Statutes, 1931, Ch. 51, par. 3, which reads:
''Where in any civil action, suit, or proceeding, the claim or defense is
founded on a book account, any party or interested person may testify
to his account book, and the items therein contained; that the same is a
book of original entries, and that the entries therein were made by him-
self, and are true and just; or that the same were made by a deceased
person, or by a disinterested person, a non-resident of the State at the
time of the trial, and were made by such deceased or non-resident person
in the usual course of trade, and of his duty or employment to the party
so testifying; and thereupon the said account book and entries shall be
admitted as evidence in the cause."
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the ruling is put. An examination of the authorities
of other jurisdictions is more likely to confuse than to
clarify the issue, and to trace our rules, step by step, as
they now exist, to their English sources, if such sources
exist, is a tedious and unprofitable undertaking. It will
be the endeavor of the writer, then, to cite only Illinois
cases insofar as it is possible to do so. However, before
discussing the first Illinois case in which the question
arose, it will be well to summarize briefly the history
of the rule in the United States and its status at that
time.
At common law the parties to an action were incom-
petent as witnesses. The early judges felt that self-
interest was a motive so all-compelling that no man
could be expected to tell the truth even under oath if the
truth would prejudice his cause. Therefore, they re-
fused to hear that which they felt that they could not
believe. The rule was a harsh one, and its effect on
the small shopkeeper can easily be imagined. If he
kept no clerk, he dared not sell on credit. For if he did,
and a dispute arose between him and his customer it
would be utterly impossible for the shopkeeper to prove
his case in a court of law. It was to remedy this situa-
tion that the "shopbook rule," as it is called, came into
being in this country. The shopkeeper was allowed
after certain preliminary proof to introduce his ac-
count book into evidence and let it prove -his case for
him. This, of course, was a clear-cut exception to the
rule against hearsay evidence, but so elaborate were
the precautions taken before the book was allowed to
go in that the courts felt that the same test could be
passed by the shopbook as could be passed by all other
exceptions to the hearsay rule; that is to say, under the
circumstances, it is probably true. But the rule was
tolerated under protest, so to speak, and judges in the
eastern states condemned it even as they applied it. 3
In Boyer v. Sweet4 the problem was presented to the
3 Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 Johns. 461.
4 4 I1. 120.
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Illinois Supreme Court for the first time. The court said:
In the case of open accounts composed of many items where
the entries are made by the party himself, no clerk being em-
ployed, the book of accounts is admissible in evidence upon
proof being made by a person who has dealt with the party and
settled by the same book that it is the party's book of accounts
and is fair and correct, and that some of the articles charged
were delivered at about the time the entries purport to have been
made, and that the entries are in the handwriting of the party
producing the book.
It will be observed that the Illinois court did not fol-
low the fashion of condemning the rule, but stated that
the common law is adopted in this state by legislative
enactment, but that this must be understood only in
those cases where that law is applicable to the habits
and conditions of our society and is in harmony with
the genius, spirit, and objects of our institutions. In
the case then, of open accounts, composed of many items
where the entries are made by the party himself, no clerk
being employed, what other evidence in the power of
the party to produce could be offered than the books
themselves? From the nature of the dealings no other
evidence could be adduced, and no danger could be
apprehended in admitting it. It is safe in practice and
tends to promote the ends of justice. The rules laid
down by the court under which account books could be
admitted were the ones commonly applied at that time.
Though the point was not specifically made that the
books must be books of original entry, this fact seems to
have been taken for granted. In McCormack v. Elston
et al,1 a case decided a few years later, the ledger of-
fered by the plaintiff was held inadmissible because it
appeared that the entries were first made in a day book.
Boyer v. Sweet has never been overruled, and books
can be introduced in evidence today by complying with
the rules and requirements therein contained. Subse-
quent decisions, have, however, elaborated and explained
5 16 Il1. 204.
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these rules so that it will be well here to recapitulate
and analyze them.
First, the book must be a book of original entry as
indicated above. By "original entry" is meant the
first permanent record of the transaction. 6 This means
that it is not important, for instance, if the entries were
first made on sales slips, and later transcribed to the
book in question, as the book is considered the first per-
manent record. Parenthetically, this requirement is not
as important as it once was due to the marked change
in bookkeeping methods that has taken place in the last
thirty years or so. Previously, merchants kept journals,
day books, cash books, subsidiary ledgers, and control
or general ledgers. But in these days of loose-leaf
ledgers and bookkeeping machines, entries are almost
invariably posted directly from the first memorandum
made of the transaction to the final ledger sheet. So it
is safe to say in most cases that occur today the ledger
offered by the merchant is a book of original entry with-
in the meaning of the rule.
Second, the entries must be contemporaneous or
nearly so. This means that the entry must be trans-
scribed within a reasonable time after the transaction
took place. In Redlich v. Bauerlee7 one month was con-
sidered not too long a time where the record was car-
ried on a slate. Third, the book offered must contain
more than a single entry.8 It will be recalled that in
Boyer v. Sweet the court said: "In the case of open
accounts composed of many items. . . . " This also is
a requirement which need not particularly concern us,
as in most cases where the question arises, the book
offered contains the running account between the par-
ties. Fourth, there must have been no clerk employed.'
8 Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Dickinson, 153 111. App. 36, aff 'd 247 Il1.
27.
7 98 Ill. 134.
8 Kibbe v. Bancroft, 77 I1. 18.
9 Boyer v. Sweet, 4 Ill. 120.
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This requirement may be traced originally to the fact
that if the shopkeeper kept a clerk, he need not testify
himself, as the clerk could go on the stand to prove
the entry.
Fifth, it must be proved that (a) someone has settled
on a basis of the books and found them correct, and (b)
some of the articles were delivered or some of the labor
was performed.10 These requirements are simply added
safeguards prescribed by the courts to insure the truth-
fulness of the books.
Cash items are not provable by the introduction of
book accounts. 1' There is obviously sound sense behind
this requirement, because cash accounts are usually evi-
denced by notes, checks, receipts, etc. However, this
requirement must not be construed too literally. An
Iowa case, Levi v. Levi 12 states that where money
charges are made in the banking business or otherwise
as a matter of fact in the ordinary course of business,
the accounts of the party making such charges will be
admissible under the shopbook rule. While the writer
has not found identical or similar language used by an
Illinois court, the books of a bank are frequently intro-
duced in evidence. 8
This is the shopbook rule in Illinois. It will be noted
that it is applicable in the strict sense only in those
cases where the proprietor of the shop kept no clerk.
If a clerk who kept the books was employed and this
clerk was available at the time of the trial, it was a
simple matter to introduce the books in evidence under
the rules concerning "refreshed recollection." These
rules are well settled in Illinois. In a recent case,
People v. Jacob Greenspawn,4 the syllabus reads:
10 Ingersoll v. Banister, 41 Ill. 388.
11 Ruggles v. Gatton, 50 Ill. 412; Schwarze v. Roessler, 40 Il. App. 474.
12 156 Iowa 297.
18 People v. Dime Savings Bank, 350 In. 503; Cooke v. People, 134 Ill.
App. 41, aff'd 231 l. 9.
14 346 fI1. 484.
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While a witness can testify only to such facts as are within
his knowledge and recollection, he may refresh and assist his
memory by the use of a written instrument, memorandum made
in the usual course of business, or entry in a book, and the
writing need not have been made by the witness himself nor
need it be an original writing and admissible in evidence, pro-
viding that after inspecting it the witness can speak to the facts
from his own recollection; but if at the time of testifying the
witness can recollect nothing except that he made the writing
and that it is an accurate record of the transaction the writing
itself may be admitted in evidence.
Under these rules, the clerk who made the entries
could either testify from "present recollection"-that
the sight of the figures in the book recalled the trans-
action involved to his mind so plainly that he could
swear that it occurred, or "past recollection"-that he
remembered the book and that he made the entries there-
in and that the writings are a correct record of the trans-
action that occurred. In either case, the same end is ob-
tained and the account is in evidence. 15
It may be well here to correct a common misconception
of the best evidence rule as applied to book accounts.
It is true that the material contents of an existing book
of original entry cannot be proved by parol testimony
as the book itself is the best evidence. "Account books,
if in existence, are the best evidence of their contents,
and a witness may not state the condition of such ac-
counts from memory while such books are accessible. "16
But this does not mean that simply because a business
transaction is entered in an account book there is no
other way of proving that transaction than by intro-
ducing the book. While books of account may be the
best evidence of their contents, they are not necessarily
the best evidence of the facts therein contained ;17 so that
15 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Cassidy, 275 fIl. 462; Richardson Fueling Co. v.
Seymour, 235 Ill. 319.
16 Inter-state Finance Corp. v. The Commercial Jewelry Co., 280 Ill. 116.
17 North American Life Insurance Co. v. Colonial Trust & Savings
Bank, 286 Ill. App. 464. '
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
if the clerk can testify from present recollection he may
use a book or memorandum, as above stated, that would
under no circumstances be admissible in evidence, yet
prove the transaction to the satisfaction of the court.
Or evidence may be introduced of an account stated or
admissions against interest."
If the entries made in the book were made by a clerk
who is dead or unavailable the shopbook rules does not
apply. At least there appears to be no case in Illinois
prior to the passage of the statute where the issue was
squarely raised, but there is little doubt that the com-
mon law rule would have adapted itself to the circum-
stances and let the books go in upon proof of the clerk's
handwriting and his subsequent death, coupled with
the other proofs required by the shopbook rule. In
Humphreys v. Spear,9 though the point was not directly
involved, the court stated that books of account kept by
a clerk might be admitted after his death if shown to
be in his handwriting. This dictum is quite in keeping
with the general common law rule of Boyer v. Sweet.
Another well settled principle of evidence which might
be applied in the supposed case, concerns "entries made
by a person, since deceased, in the ordinary course of
business." From the United States Supreme Court case,
Nicholls v. Webb 20it may be taken that memorandums,
entered in an account book in the ordinary course of
business by a person whose duty requires that he per-
form the act of which he makes the entry, are, in case
of his death, admissible in evidence of the act so done.
This rule obtained in England from a very early date,
though the English cases stressed two points. The
person making the entry must owe a duty to a superior
to make the entry correctly; also he must make the
entry as a matter of routine in the regular course of his
duties, and he must be dead at the time of the trial.21
1s The Chicago Smelting Co. v. Sullivan, 246 Il1. App. 538.
19 15 Ill. 275.
20 8 Wheat. 326.
21 Price v. Earl of Torrington, 1 Salk. 285, 2 Raym. Ld. 873.
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American courts, as indicated above, in Nicholls v.
Webb, have quite generally ignored the requirement of
duty to a superior. The two cases involving this rule,
which are familiar to most of us, are those of the wheel-
wright who repaired the wagon wheel2 and the case of
the law clerk who served the notices.2" Both of these
appear in most standard case books on evidences; so
it is apparent that no great difficulty would be involved
at common law if the entries were made by a clerk in-
stead of by the party himself.
The statute enacted in 1867 greatly simplified the in-
troduction of account books in those cases where it
applied. However, it did not change the rules as to the
admissibility of book accounts 24 nor did it change the old
law as to the character of the book that may be ad-
mitted, nor the items or charges that may be proved by
it.25 In short, the effect of section 3 is solely to change
the character of the preliminary proof sufficient to admit
book accounts ;2' and it will be observed at once that
there are three situations not covered by the statute:
If the proprietor of the business kept the book and is
dead at the time of the trial, or if a clerk kept the book
and both the clerk and the proprietor are dead or un-
available at the time of the trial, or if the book was
kept by a clerk who is neither dead nor out of the
jurisdiction, but who is unavailable at the time of the
trial." In these cases, we must still look to the com-
mon law to furnish a means of introducing the books
into evidence.
We have not yet considered the problem that arises
when the entries in the books of account which are
sought to be introduced were made by one with no
22 Lassone v. Boston & L. R. R., 66 N. H. 345.
23 Doe dem. Patteshall v. Turford, 3 Barn. & Adol. 890.
24 Taliaferro v. Ives, 51 Inl. 247.
25Boyd v. Jennings, 46 Ill. App. 290.
26 Brooks v. Funk, 85 Ill. App. 631.
27 For wording of statute see footnote 2.
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first-hand knowledge of the facts recorded. This, of
course, is the ordinary situation which confronts the
attorney. In these days, the bookkeeping departments
of most concerns are as far removed from the depart-
ment where sales are made or where labor is performed
as if the two were separate and distinct business enter-
prises. The first case in Illinois in which this problem
arose is Stettauer v. White.2" The court reached the
conclusion that the statute could not apply to such a
situation, and looked to the common law for the rules
that govern. The court said:
But at common law, where the clerk who made the entries had
no knowledge of the correctness of the same, but made them as
the items were furnished by another, it was essential that the
party furnishing the items should testify to their correctness,
or that satisfactory proof thereof, (such as the transactions were
reasonably susceptible of), from other sources should be pro-
duced.
Parenthetically it may be said here that House v.
Beak29 expressly overrules the holding in Presbyterian
Church v. Emerson ° that the statute is a repeal of the
common law rule as to the admissibility of account
books, and reiterates the doctrine of Stettauer v. White.
Let us first consider the case where A does work or
sells goods and reports the fact to B who makes the
appropriate entries. Obviously, there is no sound rea-
son why these books should not be admitted if A and
B are both put on the stand to testify as to the facts
within their knowledge, nor is the problem changed by
introducing others who lengthen the chain."' This situ-
ation is covered by the first part of the rule as laid down
in Stettauer v. White. However, when one or more of
the parties in the chain are unavailable, it is necessary
to consider that part of the rule which states that
28 98 Il. 72.
29 141 fl. 290.
80 66 111. 269.
81 Wright v. Charbonneau, 122 I1. App. 52.
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"satisfactory proof thereof, such as the transactions
are reasonably susceptible of, from other sources should
be produced."
A leading case involving this point is Chisholm v.
The Beaman Machine Company.2 In this case the ma-
chine company was suing Chisholm for labor done and
materials furnished at his instance. The record of the
labor was kept as follows: Each workman, at the close
of the day, entered upon a time slip the number of hours
he had worked and dropped the slip in a locked box.
The next morning the foreman collected the slips,
checked them, and if he found them to be correct, de-
livered them to the bookkeeper who entered them in the
books. The bookkeeper and the foreman testified but
the workmen did not, and while a great number of the
time slips, some 5,000 in fact, were introduced into evi-
dence, there were more of the time slips that were not
produced in court, though these slips were in the pos-
sesion of the plaintiff, and were ready to be produced.
The court allowed the books to go in and dispensed
with the evidence of the workmen saying:
This [testifying of the workmen] certainly would have been the
best evidence upon the subject, but it is easy to see that upon
the trial of a case like this, occurring long after the transac-
tions denoted by the entries, it might not be possible to find the
men who made the slips.
This rule may be called the "composite entry rule."
In other words, the court regards the whole chain of
reports as one bookkeeping transaction. If satisfactory
evidence can be produced, having regard to the nature
of the transaction, the court will consider the book to
be in the same class with those which are produced and
sworn to directly by the person who knew and recorded
the facts himself. This is quite logical. If A makes
the sale and reports to B, who enters it in the account
book, if it can be shown that B 's entry is correct, this
entry is merely a record of A's recollection. True, the
82 160 l1. 101.
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fact that there have been two steps instead of one in-
creases, perhaps, the probability of error, but this af-
fects the weight of the evidence, and not its admis-
sibility.
Ryan Car Company v. Gardner3 3 is a case where the
facts are very similar to those in the case last cited and
the ruling is the same. It is in these cases we begin to
notice a slight relaxation of the rigid rules applied to
book accounts in the early reports. As previously men-
tioned, even though the Illinois courts did not denounce
such evidence when it was first presented, it was gen-
erally regarded as unsatisfactory and admissible only
from necessity. But about this time it began to be felt
that books of account were entitled to more credit than
was previously accorded them. Every day in the com-
mercial world money is loaned and credit extended on
the basis of account books without any of the elaborate
precautions being resorted to that to this time were
necessary in a court of law. Shrewd bank cashiers find
it impossible to falsify their accounts in a manner which
will escape the accountant's examination. Petty thieving
by employees from merchandise stocks can be located
and stopped by the examination of the inventory ac-
count. Government income tax experts, as a rule, search
no further than the account books of the business. Yet,
these same account books would have been held inadmis-
sible to establish the sale of a few spools of thread,
because the clerk at the counter who made the sale was
no longer employed by the plaintiff company. Writers
upon the subject recognized this fact and were uniform
in urging that the rules of evidence be relaxed to admit
account books in evidence if vouched for by authority
that the commercial world would recognize as credible.
Professor Wigmore, in his work on evidence 34 says,
Now, the ordinary conditions of mercantile and industrial life
33 154 Ill. App. 565.
34 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law (2d Ed.), III, sec. 1530.
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in some offices do in fact constantly present just such a ease of
practical impossibility [the impossibility of producing everyone
in the chain to testify]. Suppose an offer of books representing
transactions during several months in a large establishment. In
the first place, the employees have in many cases changed, and
the former ones cannot be found; in the next place, it cannot
always be ascertained accurately which employee was concerned
in each one of the transactions represented by the hundreds of
entries; in the third place, even if they could be ascertained,
the production of the scores of employees to attend court and
identify in tedious succession the detailed items of transactions
would interrupt and derange the work of the establishment, and
the evidence would be obtained at a cost practically prohibitory;
and finally, the memory of such persons, when summoned, would
usually afford little real aid. If unavailability or impossibility
is the general principle that controls, is not this a real case of
unavailability? Having regard to the fact of mercantile and
industrial life, it cannot be doubted that it is. In such a ease,
it should be sufficient if the books were verified on the stand by
a supervising officer who knew them to be the books of regular
entries kept in that establishment.
Greenleaf speaks to substantially the same effect.35
Benjamin N. Cardozo, now on the United States Su-
preme Court Bench, in an article written a number of
years ago, stated that he was convinced it would be
in the interest of justice that a statute should be en-
acted in all states, making entries in books of account
admissible as prima facie evidence upon the sole proof
that they were made in the usual course of business.6
The weight of these opinions has been felt throughout
the country and Illinois is no exception to the rule.
In Cook v. People,87 which was a criminal trial for
conspiracy to defraud the country of money, the court
held that books of a bank are admissible to show that the
85 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, I, see. 118 et
seq. and notes.
8SBenjamin N. Cardozo, "A Ministry of Justice," 35 Harv. L. Rev.
122.
87 231 nIl. 9.
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proceeds of warrants issued to fictitious persons reached
the private account of the accused if the deposit slips and
books are identified by the cashier of the bank, who tes-
tified that the entries were made in the usual course of
business, although they were not made by him personally,
but by other clerks, who, since the bank ceased to exist
had moved to different places. The court cited Chisholm
v. Beaman Machine Company.
The problem was considered and exhaustively discussed
in People v. Small.3 8 This was the case, it will be recalled,
where the State of Illinois recovered something over a
half million dollars of the funds of the State for which
former Governor Len Small had failed to account when
he was treasurer. Here it was sought to introduce books
of a bank in evidence without producing the clerks who
made the entries and without making a showing that these
clerks were dead or without the jurisdiction. The court
allowed the books to go in, quoted the section from Pro-
fessor Wigmore's work that is quoted above, and con-
cluded by saying,
the business of this great commercial country is transacted on
records kept in the usual course of business and vouched for by
the supervising officer, and such evidence ought to be competent
in a court of justice. Modern authority sustains this view.
The court cites, among others, Cook v. People. It is
true that in People v. Vammar 9 the court refused to al-
low the books of a bank in evidence on a somewhat similar
set of facts. But this was a criminal trial, and the court
appears to base the decision on the grounds that the ac-
cused has a constitutional right to confront the witnesses
testifying against him.4
In First National Bank of Stronghurst v. Vaughan,41
the bank offered in evidence the ledger sheets of Vaugh-
38 319 Ill. 437.
39 320 fll. 287.
40 i1. Const. 1870, Art. II, sec. 9.
41 240 1. App. 50.
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an's account. It was objected that the books were in-
competent because several persons making entries there-
in did not testify to their correctness, although within the
jurisdiction of the court. It was objected further that the
original deposit slips and cash books weie not offered.
The cashier testified that he had been employed by the
bank during the period covered, that the books were kept
under his supervision, and that the entries were made in
the usual course of business and were true and accurate.
It was admitted that one of the witnesses who worked on
the books was within the jurisdiction but was under quar-
antine for a contagious disease at the time. The court
held the ledger sheets admissible.
In National Malleable Castings Company v. Iroquois
Steel and Iron Company' a very similar question arose.
Books were offered in evidence. One Madigan, who had
worked on the books, was present in the town but was
visiting a relative who was ill at the hospital. The court
allowed the books to go into evidence, citing the now fa-
miliar rule that it is sufficient that a book be verified by
a supervising officer who knows it to be a book of regular
entry kept in the usual course of business, regard being
had to the nature of the business and the method of its
conduct in determining what is the best evidence. The
most recent case in which the same point is discussed is
Rawleigh v. UlM.48 It is not quite apparent just what
preliminary proof was offered in this case, but the court
states that it complied with the rule laid down in People
v. Small.
Now, all these cases are within the rule laid down in
Stettauer v. White. There has been no departure from
well recognized and long established principles, for it will
be remembered that it is essential that the party furnish-
ing the items should testify to their correctness, or that
satisfactory proof thereof such as the transactions are
reasonably susceptible of from other sources should be
42 333 il. 588.
48 268 111. App. 248.
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produced. These are all "composite entry" cases where
for one reason or another the chain stretching from the
one with first-hand knowledge to the one who made the
entries is incomplete at the time of the trial. In these
cases, the court has allowed proof of the correctness of
the entries obtained from other sources. People v. Small
has, perhaps, gone farther than any preceding case. But
it stands on precisely the same ground as Chisholm v.
Beaman Machine Company.
Studying the language used in the later cases cited
above, it is apparent that the courts are willing, even
eager, to relax the common law requirements necessary
to introduce account books in evidence. In People v.
Small they have come as close as they well could, under
our decisions, to observing the rule recommended by Pro-
fessor Wigmore, Mr. Justice Cardozo, and a host of
others. But having gone as far as they can, the situation
is still, from the lawyer's point of view, a most unsatis-
factory one.
Section 3 of the Evidence Act is incomplete, as has
been seen. If it provided that books of account could be
introduced upon the oath of the supervising officer that
they are in fact the books of original entry, kept under
his care and are true and correct, the beneficial results
of such a change can easily be perceived. We would be
confronted then, not with the multitude of overlapping,
clumsy, and some times conflicting requirements which
now exist, but with a simple, practical, and essentially
logical rule as to book accounts, which could be satisfied
as easily as it could be understood. It is to be hoped
that our legislature will see fit to make this change.
There are a number of cases which the writer has not
discussed. In one case 4 books were admitted apparently
on no other ground than that they were a part of the res
gestae. In others 45 they go in, apparently, as admissions
44 C. & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Ingersoll, 65 Il1. 399.
45 Dows v. Naper, 91 Il. 44; Chicago Smelting Co. v. Sullivan, 246 Ill.
App. 538.
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against interest. In one case,"' the facts were so unusual
that the writer considers it can have little weight as an
authority.
Inasmuch as this article has in necessity dealt with a
number of different situations in which it is necessary to
introduce books, it may be well to close with a brief sum-
mary and analysis.
SUMMARY
I
Bookkeeping entries made by one who has knowledge
of the facts recorded, (a) if made by the party himself,
and he is living, may go in by complying with the require-
ments laid down in Boyer v. Sweet, or by complying with
the provisions of paragraph 3 of the statute, or by using
the rules as to refreshed recollection; if the party is dead,
the common law rules of Boyer v. Sweet must be used; (b)
if made by a clerk who is available as a witness, may go
in under the rule as to refreshed recollection. If the
clerk is dead or out of the jurisdiction, section 3 applies.
If the clerk is unavailable, the case may be within the res
gestae principle set out in Chicago & Northwestern Rail-
road v. Ingersoll.4 7 If not, the principle of Humphreys v.
Spear,4 of entries made in course of duty, should apply.
II
Bookkeeping entries made by one who has no first
hand knowledge of the facts recorded are admissible in
evidence (a) if all the parties in the chain are available
and are called, under the principle set out in Wright v.
Charbonneau; (b) if some part of the chain is unavail-
able, and all those who can should testify, particularly
the supervising officer, may go in under the principles of
Chisholm v. Beaman Machine Co., People v. Small, and
National Malleable Castings Company v. Iroquois Steel
and Iron Company.
46 P. C. C. & St. L. By. Co. v. Chicago, 242 Il1. 178.
47 65 In. 399.
48 15 fll. 275.
